

X Jornadas de Sociología. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires, 2013.

Estudio sobre la cultura militar chilena: ¿xenofobia contra los vecinos?.

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Cita:

Johanna Fedorovsky (2013). *Estudio sobre la cultura militar chilena: ¿xenofobia contra los vecinos?.* X Jornadas de Sociología. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires.

Dirección estable: <https://www.aacademica.org/000-038/251>

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X Jornadas de Sociología de la UBA.

20 años de pensar y repensar la sociología.

Nuevos desafíos académicos, científicos y políticos para el siglo XXI

1 a 6 de Julio de 2013

Mesa: N° 17 - "Estudios sobre Fuerzas Armadas: Debates, aportes y perspectivas en Argentina y América Latina"

Título de la ponencia: "Chilean Military Culture Study: Xenophobic Features Against the Neighbors?"

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CHILEAN MILITARY CULTURE STUDY: XENOPHOBIC FEATURES AGAINST THE NEIGHBORS?

Johanna M. Fedorovsky

Abstract

During the first days of February 2013, an amateur video was uploaded to *Youtube*. The material showed Chilean soldiers from the Navy training in the streets of Viña del Mar while performing xenophobic chants against Argentines, Peruvians and Bolivians. After that release, a diplomatic situation emerged and Chilean central authorities rushed into an apologetic tone. They promised that the situation showed in the video was not normal and that measures were going to be taken in order to prevent more xenophobic episodes within the Armed Forces. On March 5th, the Chilean government claimed to have identified and punished the officers responsible for such behavior.

Considering the relevance reported by the *affair* and the different responses, this paper aims to understand it by focusing in its *ground zero*, i.e. the Chilean Navy. Under a culturalist approach, the objective of this paper then is to determine the main features of Chilean military culture. That will serve to establish whether the Chilean chants were in fact something normal or pathological among the practices of the cadets involved in the incident.

In order to achieve this goal, Chilean military culture is “constructed” by the use of secondary qualitative sources. Those sources cover different levels in which this particular military culture reaches an expression. It is important to highlight that military culture is approached in a historical perspective primarily focused on the post-authoritarian period inaugurated in the 90's.

1. Introduction

Chile is a country located in South America, bordering with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru. It is a country with a very special geography, since it has a pronounced length that contrasts with its breadth and gives Chile a West sea front of 4.300 km over the Pacific Ocean (Chile's Navy Doctrine, 2009: 31). On the East, Chile borders with the Andes, a natural barrier that to some extent isolates the country both materially and symbolically.

The history of Chile as an independent nation began in 1818, after liberating from Spain's domain. The fights for the independence in South America led to the emergency of a *pan-american-proto-nationality*. That nationality lasted for some decades but eventually it was replaced with the more classical type of territorial-bound identities, i.e. Chileans, Peruvians, etc. (Escudé, 2009: 1). That was the context in which the *Pacific War* (1879-1883) between Chile and, Bolivia and Peru, took place as a dispute for Northern territories. That was the context also, where territorial controversies with Argentina over Southern territories began. With their own logics those conflicts managed to persist in time and thus, are fundamental to understand Chile's nowadays' relationship with its neighbors. Even today, when Latin American countries endorse integrationist positions at a regional level, frictions are still evident. The case of Argentina is probably the “lighter” one, since

the countries reached a solution that led to the *Tratado de Paz y Amistad (Treaty of Peace and Friendship)* signed in 1984. The *Pacific War* heritage, on the other hand, is a much more sensitive issue. In 2008 Peru presented a complaint in The Hague over maritime sovereignty, an unresolved situation related to the war outcome; the tribunal's decision hasn't arrived yet. Furthermore, Bolivia has recently announced that soon will follow the Peruvian's steps in international courts to reclaim over free access to the Pacific Ocean. For Chile this is not a minor problem since the country intends to keep nurturing a good international reputation as the one built during the last years. Also, this kind of conflict represents a possible obstacle to fully profit from regional economic flows.

The particular geopolitical position of Chile serves to frame the incident under study in this paper; i.e. the *affair* of the military xenophobic chants. That situation reached public state during the first days of February 2013, when an amateur video uploaded to *Youtube* viralized. It showed Chilean Navy cadets training in the streets of Viña del Mar while performing xenophobic chants against Argentineans, Peruvians and Bolivians. After that release, a diplomatic situation emerged and Chilean central authorities rushed into an apologetic tone. They promised that the situation showed in the video was not normal and that measures were going to be taken in order to prevent more xenophobic episodes within the Armed Forces. On March 5th, the Chilean government claimed to have identified and punished the officers responsible for such behavior.

Considering the relevance reported by the *affair* and the different responses it harvested, this paper aims to understand it further by focusing in its *ground zero*, i.e. the Chilean Navy. Under a culturalist approach, the objective of this paper is then to determine the main features of Chilean military culture. That will be useful to establish whether the Chilean chants were in fact something normal or pathological among the practices of the cadets involved in the incident.

In order to achieve this paper's goal, Chilean military culture is "constructed" by the use of secondary qualitative sources. They cover different levels in which this particular military culture reaches an expression. Information comes from official documents such as the Navy's doctrine and the Chilean Defense guidelines. Those are complemented with more informal, yet institutional, data from online platforms like Web pages, *Youtube* Channels, *Facebook* profiles and *Twitter* accounts. The only non-fully-institutional source used within this paper is the *Twitter* account of Commander in Chief of the Navy Edmundo González. It is important to highlight that military culture is approached in a historical perspective primarily focused on the post-authoritarian period inaugurated in the 90's. The working methodology and the data taken into consideration respond to a prior theoretical decision, which is the adoption of the military culture developed definition by C. Ruffa (2012). This definition alludes to both symbolical and behavioral features of military cultures.

The paper is structured in order to make theoretical, methodological and empirical considerations meet in a way that helps clarify the *affair*. In the first section, the xenophobic chants incident and its repercussions on the political/ diplomatic level are described according to information provided by traditional media coverage. A second section "reconstructs" Chilean military culture to determine the normal or pathological character of the event. Then, the text closes with a Conclusion that summarizes the main findings emerging from this study, including a brief presentation of alternative lines of analysis for the same *affair*.

It is important to state that beyond the mere scientific/curious spirit that enlightens this research study, a practical motivation prevails. That motivation is linked to the current political moment that Latin America is undergoing. During the 2000's, regional integration broke into the foreign policy agenda. Since then, cooperative actions were effectively

taken. The recent creation of CELAC –*Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States)*– in 2010 can be taken as an example of that. Inquiring about the roots of the xenophobic chants performed by Chileans cadets is an important input to assess the actual scope of Latin American regional integration. It fits in the general question about how possible is for Latin Americans to revive the *pan-american-proto-nationality*.

2. The incident: “*Argentinos mataré, bolivianos fusilaré, peruanos degollaré*”

On January 28th 2013 a group of twenty seven Navy cadets were caught on tape while training in the streets of Viña del Mar, one of the most important cities of Chile. They were performing xenophobic chants against Argentineans, Bolivians and Peruvians. The chant consisted in the three phrases: “*I will kill Argentineans, I will execute Bolivians, I will cut the throat of Peruvians*”[\[1\]](#). The Argentinean tourist that made the video uploaded it to *Youtube* and soon it viralized.

The political scandal began on February 6th 2013, when written press echoed the news about the xenophobic chants. That day, the incident was covered by different media in the Latin American region and then it spread to the international media like ABC, BBC and CNN. Since a diplomatic situation emerged and risked damaging the relationship of Chile with its neighbors, Chilean government reacted the very same day of the news. The authorities rushed into an apologetic tone. The Deputy Minister of Defense Alfonso Vargas qualified the chants as “unfortunate” and also affirmed that they didn’t reflect nor the governments position neither the feelings of the majority of the Chilean people (CNN México, 7/2/2013). The Secretary-General of the Government Cecilia Pérez also went public and called the event “shameful”, while assuring internal investigations and severe punishments to be duly applied. She explicitly rejected the xenophobic chants, regardless they were performed inside or outside military facilities (*Youtube Video*, 6/2/2013a). The official reaction of the Navy was expressed by a brief press released in which it was stated that an investigation was going to be conducted in order to establish responsibilities and set appropriate penalties. Also, it was pointed that the kind of practices shown in the video were opposite to the Navy’s spirit and doctrine (Chile’s Navy, 6/2/2013). The official position though, should be contrasted with other voices of Chile’s political scene. The right-wing *pinochetist* Parliament member Gonzalo Arenas Hödar used Twitter to criticize the Deputy Ministry of Defense’s approach. He ironically claimed that the Navy should teach the cadets to sing child’s songs and to sew and knit (*La Nación*, 7/2/2013). Probably even more disruptive was the position presented by the Parliament Member Alberto Cardemil, who belongs to the same party that President Sebastián Piñera. Mr. Cardemil expressed that “*Soldiers are not little boys neither nuns, they are prepared to go to war since that is a possible scenario.*”[\[2\]](#) (*Ámbito.com*, 7/2/2013)

Anyway, Chile’s official reaction was acknowledged and celebrated by Argentinean and Peruvian authorities. Even though they rejected the chants, they preferred to focus on the fact that Chile’s Government publicly condemned the xenophobic content of the chants and acted quickly to investigate the *affair*. That is shown, for instance, by the declaration of the Argentinean Defense Minister Arturo Puricelli, who claimed that the chants were unacceptable but at the same time highlighted the prompt reaction of Chilean’s Executive (CNN México, Op. Cit.). On the Peruvian side, the Ministry of Defense Pedro Cateriano minimized the scandal and put the focus on the fact that both countries are working together in order to strengthen their relationship (*Ámbito.com*, Op. cit.). It’s interesting to

note that Argentinean press adopted a similar perspective to the one expressed by Minister Puricelli. Peruvian press, instead, was more reactive to the incident. The case of Bolivia shows the stronger reaction among the three neighbors. The Bolivian Deputy Ministry of Coordination of Social Movements César Navarro menaced to set an international complaint against Chile. Bolivia strongly underlined that Chilean Navy's xenophobic chants contradicted basic international commitments present in the UN, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UNSASUR provisions.

Back to the chronology, on February 7th, the preliminary report of the *affair* was delivered by the Navy to the Chilean government. When consulted about the outcome and next steps, Vargas hinted that it would be absurd to punish the whole group in the same way, since the level of responsibilities in the incident was differential. On March 5th 2013, the results of the investigation were publicly announced. It determined that the xenophobic phrases were improvised by a "young cadet" that at the moment was in charge of leading the chants of the group. As a consequence two officers, the Lieutenant Commander and the Deputy Sergeant in charge of the training session, were found responsible. The Navy announced "severe punishments" without giving further details. Regarding the responsibility of the young cadet, Chilean Ministry of Defense Rodrigo Hinzpeter claimed that he was probably going to be penalized by the institution (La Mañana Neuquén, 5/3/2013). Also, it was announced that the punished Navy members would have the right to appeal the decision within the following three days. The news about the outcome of the investigation echoed in the media of the different countries involved. Anyway, it didn't reach the same level of diffusion as the news of the incident itself. Furthermore, no official reactions from main political officers were deployed in this second stage of the *affair*.

Before closing this section, it is interesting to pay attention to the Chilean television coverage of the issue. News TV shows provided coverage that favored the spread of the official message. Other TV show formats, like morning magazines, were more open to explore the different positions. Those kinds of broadcasts gave space to the "real" people's perspective by doing on-street casual interviews. They also included analysis made by specialists. A very interesting example is the TV show *Mucho Gusto* from February 8th. The debate on *Mucho Gusto* was whether the chants themselves were inappropriate, or whether the inappropriate thing was to sing them outside military facilities. While most of the voices accorded in rejecting the chants, consensus was not reached in terms of the outside/inside military facilities topic. Indeed, the idea that inside-doors chants are not a problem was embraced by many interview people.

Considering the incident and the reactions it generated, it is not clear whether it was a normal thing or a pathological feature. That is why it is necessary to investigate further by focusing on Chilean's Navy. The next section of this paper thus inquires about the Chile's Navy military culture.

3. Chile's Military Culture

What follows in this section is a detailed analysis of sources providing different images of Chilean Navy's culture. The aim is to cover a wide range of expressions, from the most formal institutional documents to the more informal/"modern" ones that are deployed in social media such as *Facebook* and *Twitter*. The underlying rationale of this choice is that military cultures can be "reconstructed" through the consideration of multiple inputs. Those sources can be, for example, the actual military practices, the history of the country, the

significant memories of the institution, and the official documents like doctrines.

The selection of the sources correlates directly with the adopted definition of military culture. To the purposes of this paper, military culture is understood as a “...*core of beliefs, attitudes and values that become deeply embedded and profoundly ingrained within a military unit and that guide the way the unit manages its internal and external life, the way it interprets its tactical and operational objectives and the way it learns and adapts to external influences.*” (Ruffa, 2012: 9). Unlike other definitions present in the fields of Security Studies and Military Sociology, Ruffa’s approach to military culture takes into consideration both behavioral aspects and unit level (Ibid). Those two specific features are of major interest for the case under study in this paper. After all, the incident was about a unit of Navy cadets training outside military facilities and thus, showing openly how their military culture expresses itself. Considering the latter, it must be acknowledge that the design of this research paper suffers a limitation, i.e. the lack of ethnographical sources. This kind of sources is probably the best way to render an accurate image of how military culture enables certain behavior within units. Of course, they are more specific than documents like doctrines or other written sources, but their value is huge. Thus, this study must be understood as a first approach open to further inputs and perspectives, rather than a settled judgment about Chile’s Navy military culture.

The analysis of sources performed in this study shows a greater degree of dedication towards the Navy’s doctrine. Anyway this should not be considered a bias. Many of the elements present in the doctrine also appear in other sources. To avoid iteration, those features are directly referred to the doctrine’s analysis.

3.1. The Navy’s perspective: “Doctrina Marítima: el Poder Marítimo Nacional” (“Navy Doctrine: National Navy Power”), 2009.

The Navy’s doctrine reflects the formal positioning of Chile’s Navy in many areas. After a qualitative analysis of the document it is possible to affirm that the Navy is an institution that perceives itself as an important part of the national identity. Considering Chile’s geographical characteristics, the Sea is presented as an essential element of the country’s economy, strategy and identity. The doctrine develops the concept of *Maritime Power* to condense all civil and military activities related to the Sea. Chilean Navy sees itself as the leading component of that *Maritime Power*, and consequently, a leading component of Chile’s society. “*Traditionally, the Armed Forces had established a direct link between its institutions, the country’s history and the conformation of a national identity. Anyway, they do not think of themselves as the only socialization agents.*”^[3] (Álvarez Veloso, 2004: 6).

Chile’s Navy affirms its own privileged position within Chilean society by taking into consideration both present and past circumstances. Regarding the latter, it is really interesting to note the slightly mythological type of narrative used to depict the Navy’s doctrine creation process as simultaneous to the conformation of the State: ‘*Navy’s Doctrine began to develop since the origin the Chilean State*’^[4] (Chile’s Navy Doctrine, 2009: 11). This link between the Navy and the Nation is understood within the doctrine as the institution’s political contribution to promote the Maritime Interests (Ibid: 13).

Two specific historical events appear to be founding moments of the Navy’s military culture; one of them serves as a positive input while the other one is used to self-define by opposition. The alluded negative example is the war against Spain (1865-1867), in which Chile was defeated; that event is taken as a paradigm of the consequences of an unprepared and resource-poor military force. The counter face of that is the *Pacific War* against Bolivia and Peru (1879-1883), a victory that Chile’s doctrine directly links to a well

trained and equipped Navy (Ibid: 13). The Pacific War is one of the core elements of the Chilean military culture. It is a milestone in Chile's history and it even has consequences nowadays, to the extent that it is crucial to understand the current relationship of Chile with its neighbors. The *Pacific War* is an example of a self-defining exercise in which superiority feelings and aversion towards the bordering countries play important roles and synergize with values of professionalism and abnegation. Regarding this latter element, it is worth noting that Chile's main naval hero is Commander Arturo Prat, who was killed at *Iquique* battle (1879) under the motto "*Defeat or Die*". Chile's Navy doctrine talks about that motto as the guiding principle of each ship belonging to the force (Ibid).

Along with the mentioned elements, other important input that helps complete the image of Chilean military culture is the text *Ordenanza de la Armada de 1988 (Navy's Ordinance 1988)*, released a few months before the plebiscite that bound Dictator Augusto Pinochet to set a democratic transition. This document is referred (and quoted) in the Chilean Navy doctrine as a core text that reflects the principles of the institution and serves to approach the "*navy ethos*": "*Even though the navy style is not explicit in any specifically document, since it is transmitted from generation to generation through the path of the example, we can induce that it responds to the main principles present in the Navy's Ordinance, which is a fundamental publication of the Navy...*"^[5] (Chile's Navy Doctrine, Op. cit: 136). It goes beyond the scope of this paper to perform a thorough analysis of Navy's Ordinance, but still is worth mentioning some elements that somehow mirror in the Navy's doctrine. In the first place, the document refers to the Navy's main goal as to defeat in the case of an armed conflict (Navy's Ordinance of 1988: Article 12). Secondly, it enumerates –in a quite tautological way– certain attributes to expect from a Navy's member, like *justice, prudence, honor, patriotism, loyalty, abnegation, courage*, among others (Ibid: Chapter V). The *justice* value is particularly interesting to understand military culture of the Chilean Navy and how it builds the "self" in a jealous opposition to the "alter": "*The virtue of Justice obtains its higher form by giving to the Homeland what belongs to the Homeland, i.e., its honor and the efficient defense against all enemy, weather its internal or external.*"^[6] (Ibid: 159). Third, the Navy's Ordinance mentions the "*Defeat or Die*" motto (Ibid: Article 168), a featured fully inherited by Navy's doctrine. Finally, the use of the term 'Homeland' is much more spread in the Navy's Ordinance than the use of "country", "State" or "Republic". Thus, when referring to obedience, it is expressed mostly as loyalty to the Homeland. Reading the latter in a symbolical code, it is possible to suggest that Navy's Ordinance shows a certain resistance to acknowledge the obedience to the Executive, since "Homeland" is a term much less linked to Modern democracy and civil authority than "State", "Republic" o "country".

The elements described above are important pieces in the puzzle of Chile's military culture; but they are not only ones. Chile's Navy doctrine presents as well other set of less offense-oriented values and guidelines. Even though the differentiation from the external enemy appears as a compelling historic input to feel and behave in an offensive way, the doctrine alludes to dissuasion as the first measure to be taken in a context where peace is prioritized over conflict (Ibid 51). In that sense, the doctrine defines Chile's defense policy as "*conservative, dissuasive, and prone to international cooperation, seeking to back the State's foreign policy; emphasizing the good relationships with bordering countries and other States of the region, reflecting that, even when some conflictive scenarios hypothesis remain, the probabilities of occurrence are low.*"^[7] (Ibid: 21). Chile's Navy doctrine reflects a moderate position towards armed conflicts, and also recognizes that the institution has a broader scope than waging war. Goals of international cooperation and internal socio-economical development activities are too part of the Navy's actions. It must be underlined though, that the military role is explicitly pointed as the most relevant one (Ibid: 74).

It's important to note also that the objectives of international cooperation as part of the activities of the Navy are particularly relevant considering the discussion occurred during the 90's over the participation of Chile in international peace operations (Álvarez Veloso, Op. cit: 12). Before that, the country would collaborate in international missions only as an "observer" (Chile's Navy Doctrine, Op. cit: 98). This is explained by the fact that until the mid 90's the Chilean military culture was predominantly focused on war; that shows particularly well in the Navy's Ordinance. The resistance to change that perspective came from Pinochet, who remained as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces until 1998. It was not until Pinochet's detention in London that changes could be fully started (Álvarez Veloso, Op. cit: 12). Anyway, broadening the scope of the military activities can be considered an achievement of the Democracy. That process explains why Navy's Doctrine openly talks about a *New Maritime Strategy* that consists in "*dissuasion, international cooperation and coercion*" (Chile's Navy Doctrine, Op. cit: 69).

Considering the short experience of Chile as an active player of international operations and the mostly declaratory nature of military doctrines in general, it is hard to tell how strong international cooperation activities impact on Chilean military culture in order to turn it more defense-oriented. In that sense, it must be highlighted that the mentioning of international cooperation in different extracts of the doctrine reports an instrumentalist tone much more than a peace-nurturing sentiment. It seems that the motivation for the international cooperation relies on taking profit of the economic potential of regional engagements (Ibid: 17) and on the building of a good international image (Ibid: 40). International cooperation is thus conceptualized as a "...*supportive task of the State's foreign policy towards the international promotion of national interest*"^[8] (Ibid). Nevertheless, that doesn't undermine Chile's effective international cooperation activities like the participation in UN's peacemaking and peacekeeping operations^[9] and the creation of *Cruz del Sur*, a joint initiative with Argentina that consists in a combined peace corps.

Linking this analysis of the Chilean Navy's doctrine to the subject of the xenophobic chants, it must be said that the text doesn't provide objective elements of strong neighbor-averse feeling. It is true though, that the Navy's identity and military culture are shown somehow related to a territorial approach. Maybe the most sensitive issue regarding the latter is the prideful reference to the *Pacific War*. But still, it would be inaccurate to affirm that the Navy's doctrine reflects a military culture endorsing xenophobic feelings towards Argentineans, Bolivians and Peruvians.

3.2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff perspective: "Libro de la Defensa Nacional" ("National Defense Book"), 2010.

To the purposes of this paper, the National Defense Book is considered a reflection of the formal positions adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even though the document is a creation of interacting political and military authorities (Álvarez Veloso, Op. cit.: 7), the National Defense Book is taken mostly as the "voice" of the elite level of Armed Forces. That responds in the first place to the very history and context in which the National Defense Book was created. Secondly, it has to do with the fact that in 2012 the Executive of Chile presented a national security and defense strategy document (ENSYD) fully developed within the frame of civil decisions. The latter explains why in this study the strategic level is addressed via the analysis of the ENSYD instead of using National Defense Book.

The National Defense Book is relatively a young institution in the history of Chile. Its

roots can be found in the particular path the country adopted to face the democratic transition that ended the formal power of Chile's military (Ibid: 3). The document can be effectively taken as a big advance of civil authorities over the Armed Forces (Ibid: 18), but it still reflects the influence military kept after leaving the space for open elections in 1989. That counts especially for the first edition of the National Defense Book, released in 1996. The second edition, of 2002, shows the increasing influence of civil authorities by adopting a more political and less conceptual line. While the first edition incorporates the focus on dissuasion, the second one goes further and proposes both dissuasion and international cooperation as the way to obtain security (Ibid: 19). The 2010 publication continues the path started in 2002.

The National Defense Book states that the use of force is valid for self-defense situations of war and crisis, and also for dissuasion and international cooperation (Chile's Defense Department, 2010). Those activities are all framed in the respect of international law provisions, especially those present in the UN's Charter (Ibid: 28 et 86). Thus, Chile acknowledges international constraints and commitments that shape the way armed forces understand its own mission. Regarding international cooperation it is important to remark the instrumentalist-like tone adopted by the National Defense Book. It is considered a tool of foreign policy that must be adjusted to the national interest, which is operationalized as prosperity and security (Ibid: 242). Yet, it must be acknowledged that an effective expanded version of the concept of security arises in the document.

The National Defense Book specifically addresses the relationship between Chile and its boarder's neighbors. This assessment suggests that the interactions with Argentina are the ones that show a friendlier *status* (Ibid: 144). Enhancements in the relationship with Bolivia (Ibid: 147) and Peru (Ibid: 148) are celebrated as well. It is important to note though, that the Peruvian complaint in The Hague is taken as an obstacle to the process of bilateral integration.

In summary, like the Navy's doctrine, the National Defense Book, doesn't show a neighbor-averse military culture. Anyway, the kind of pacific-prone attitude that is presented in it must be duly contrasted with the fact that war and crisis occupy a preferential position in the armed forces mission.

3.3. The Executive perspective: "Estrategia Nacional de Seguridad y Defensa - ENSYD" ("National Strategy on Security and Defense"), 2012.

The National Strategy on Security and Defense (ENSYD) document is the most suitable source to understand the position of Chilean civil authorities towards the Defense area. That is so not only because the ENSYD is the most recent publication showing the Executive's points of view, but also it relates to the fact that it is essentially a civilian-elaborated text. The document is introduced as a complement to the National Defense Book (Chile's National Government, 2012a: 5); it is an answer to the XXI century scenario. To that extent, the ENSYD aims to address the challenges of globalization, expansion of democracy, proliferation of high-tech, and cooperation (Chile's National Government, 2012: 1). The theoretical decision of considering this document as part of the military culture of the Chilean Navy aligns with Kier's perspective. She poses that "...*civilian decisions* [made by decision-makers] *affect later doctrinal developments*." (Kier, 1995:66). In that sense, it must be acknowledged that positions within the ENSYD may not fully reflect in the military culture since it was released less than a year ago, in June 2012.

One of the core elements of the ENSYD is the concept of "extended security". Within that notion, development and cooperation play key roles. Along with the use of

force, they are the basis for building a secure environment both internally and externally. In that same path, ENSYD embraces international law as the first tool to solve disputes (Chile's National Government, 2012, Op. cit: 21). The ENSYD proposes the use of force only as a legitimate right to self-defense. Dissuasion and international cooperation must come first (Ibid: 14). The latter is conceptualized as the contribution of the armed forces to a type of integration that seeks to transcend mere economic interests. "*Chile pretends to make integration go deeper, mainly in those subjects related to the South American sphere, and especially with countries like Argentina, Brazil and the members of the "Pacific Alliance": Peru, Colombia and Mexico*"^[10] (Ibid: 12). Thus, the ENSYD promotes participation in peace operations and in regional organizations, including those dedicated to joint inter-states defense efforts (Ibid. 28-29).

The focus on international cooperation must be understood within a wider frame, which is the low probability of occurrence of inter-state conflict hypothesis (Ibid. 10). That leaves the space to a definition of the enemy different from that based on the external foe. The new enemies are those related to the organized crime, cyber-attacks, terrorism and weapons proliferation (Ibid: 24).

Considering the specific features of the ENSYD, it is possible to identify some common grounds with the military documents depicted in the previous sections. Anyway, it is evident that different rationales drive each document. It is not possible then to think that just because of the ENSYD, Chilean military will reverse the powerful implications that the external enemy definition has within the military culture. Furthermore, the possible impact of the ENSYD on the military culture must be evaluated within its specific reception among different actors of the society. The ENSYD was presented in June 2012 as draft, and in August of the same year as a final text. It was not particularly celebrated in the political scene and its approval by the Chilean's Senate is still pending. The lack of enthusiasm about the ENSYD in military circles is not surprising. It has to do with the fact that the ENSYD clearly tries to go a step further in eroding the prerogatives that the armed forces granted for themselves during the democratic transition. The proposal of the ENSYD includes modification on the way how the military obtain their funds (Ibid: 70), and the aim to make the military expenditures a legislative and more transparent issue (Ibid: 60). It clearly opposes to bureaucratic interests.

3.4. The Navy on the E-media

The consideration of digital sources within this paper aims to detect how military culture reaches expression in more informal channels. The importance of those communicating platforms relates to the fact that they are more public-oriented than official documents. Internet tools are thus an important way in which armed forces outreach general public.

The selection of sources for this study include: the web pages of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chilean Navy and the Navy's Polytechnic Academy; the *Youtube* channel, *Facebook* profile and *Twitter* account of the Chilean Navy; and the *Twitter* account of Commander in Chief of the Navy Edmundo González. The general conclusion that can be posed after the analyzing them is that the contents present in the different platforms doesn't express a xenophobic perspective. In deed, international issues are mostly disregarded as well as it happens with considerations about war or crisis. The information, instead, focuses on development-related internal tasks and military exercises, parades or celebrations. Sea security measures are one of the issues that attract much of the attention. Regarding the "navy style", the *Youtube* institutional videos play an important role. The video "*Hombres de Mar*" ("*Seamen*") is an emblematic example of how the

institution perceives and projects its own identity. That navy *ethos* features the values of abnegation, commitment, vocation and sea-passion.

Among the digital sources, probably the most significant for the case under analysis is the *Twitter* account of Commander in Chief of the Navy Edmundo González. Even though the account is an extra-official one, Mr. González presents a strong professional identity on it. He uses the account to refer both to Navy's and personal issues. The mentioning of the xenophobic incident didn't reach major expression within it, but still presents particular highlights. First, on February 6th 2013, he expressed that the affair was going to be investigated and that the chants didn't reflect the Navy's spirit. On March 5th, the day when the outcome of the investigation was released, he didn't refer at all to the topic. Then, on March 13th he responded to a question regarding the future of the officers found responsible for the incident. It was a question from someone worried about the penalties they might receive; it included a request for an "indulgent" position (<https://twitter.com/edmundog190/status/312059366914285568>). Mr. González said that appealing process was on, and that "*the members of Navy are not an unjust*"^[11] (Ibid). When the same person insisted in the inquiring, Mr. González stated: "*be confident and don't ask so many questions.*"^[12] Even when isolated and not supported by the other documents within this paper, this conversation might give an interesting clue of Chilean's Navy military culture. Of course is not possible to confirm a covering-up attitude from it. But definitively it invites to further research in other less formal sources capable of rendering Chile's navy military culture beyond official positions.

3. Conclusions

The analysis conducted in this paper shows interesting features of the Chilean military culture. From the selected sources, it is possible to suggest that the xenophobic chants *affair* was a pathological incident, external to the spirit of Chile's civil and military authorities. Anyway, the methodological limitations of the research design and some hints regarding the social reactions to the incident, depict a scenario where that conclusion seems to be incomplete or at least, provisory. Thus, to fully understand the case under study from a cultural perspective, it is necessary to expand the selection of sources. Ethnographical inquiring seems to be a crucial input. Also, the study of semi-official sources, like articles written by Navy members and published in official magazines, could be elements to enrich the analysis.

The latter opens the space to the question about alternative explanations. From a realist perspective, Chile's generous defense budget could be a starting point. Chile's military power is prominent in the Latin American Region. In deed, if compared to the capacities of Argentina, Bolivia and Peru, it turns out to be asymmetrical (Business Monitor International Ltd, 2012: 75-76). That budget could be taken as a sign of a power-seeking attitude, where the definition of the bordering countries as foes could perfectly fit. On the other hand, bureaucratic politics explanations could be appropriate as well. It is important to bear in mind that the xenophobic chants *affair* took place six months later to the presentation of the ENSYD. The possibility of a corporative reaction to the civil "intromission" attempt can't be dismissed. After all, the xenophobic chant risking regional integration achievements is symbolically compatible to a demonstration of autonomy. This thesis acquires more force when adding the information that at the same time that ENSYD was presented, the Chilean government passed a law aiming to change the current budgetary system of the military^[13]. The approval by Senate is pending, but regardless its

implementation, it is evident that the civil authorities performed relevant actions to constrain military prerogatives.

To conclude, even though this study doesn't provide a picture capable of rendering the Chilean military culture, it must be remarked that its findings are important. The systematical approach to the Chilean official defense documents is a significant material to understand how the strategic and political levels address to the current context of multilateralism and regionalism. Chile's political intentions are to reaffirm the democratic values and to show to the international –and specifically regional– community that the country is no longer a “solo-player”. Of course regressive elements persist in the Chilean culture (including the military culture), but that doesn't occlude the importance of the message within the global scope inherent to the XXI century.

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[1] In Spanish, “*Argentinos mataré, bolivianos fusilaré, peruanos degollaré.*”

[2] In Spanish, “*Los soldados no son niñitos ni monjas, son gente preparada para las guerras porque los países entienden que son un escenario posible.*” (Ámbito.com, 7/2/2013).

[3] “*Tradicionalmente las Fuerzas Armadas han establecido un vínculo estrecho entre las instituciones que lo componen, las historia del país y la formación de una identidad nacional. Obviamente, no se piensan como agentes exclusivos de la socialización.*” (Álvarez Veloso, 2004: 6).

[4] “*La doctrina de la Armada se comenzó a formar desde el nacimiento mismo del Estado de Chile*” (Chile’s Navy Doctrine, 2009: 11)

[5] “*Aunque el estilo naval no está contenido específicamente en un documento, ya que se transmite de generación en generación por la vía del ejemplo, podemos inducir que responde a los principios rectores contenidos en la Ordenanza de la Armada, publicación fundamental de la institución...*” (Ibid: 136).

[6] “*La virtud de la justicia tiene su forma más alta en aquella por la cual se debe dar a la Patria lo que es suyo, es decir, su honor y la defensa eficaz contra todos sus enemigos, sean externos, o internos.*” (Navy’s Ordinance of 1988: Article 159).

[7] “*...aplicando una Política de Defensa conservadora, disuasiva y de cooperación internacional, que respalde a la política exterior del Estado; haciendo énfasis en las buenas relaciones con los países vecinos y de la región. Chile comparte la satisfacción por el ambiente pacífico de la región, lo que es un reflejo de que aunque se mantengan vigentes algunas hipótesis de conflicto, sus probabilidades de ocurrencia son bajas.*” (Ibid: 21)

[8] *“En cuanto al rol de apoyo a la política exterior del Estado (Vector Internacional), el esfuerzo está dirigido a la promoción internacional del interés nacional...”*. (Ibid: 40).

[9] For detailed information on Chile's international peace missions refer to Péndola Brondi (2005): [Chile y las Operaciones de Paz: de la participación individual a Haití](#).

[10] *“Chile busca profundizar la integración en distintos planos, principalmente en el ámbito sudamericano y con énfasis en países como Argentina, Brasil y los integrantes de la “Alianza del Pacífico: Perú, Colombia y México.”* (ENSYD, 2012: 12).

[11] *“En la Marina no somos injustos.”* (<https://twitter.com/edmundog190/status/312059366914285568>)

[12] *“Entonces tenga confianza y no pregunte tanto”* (Ibid).

[13] Chile's military funding relies basically in two elements: the country's ordinary budget and the 10% of annual incomes from the copper State's company CODELCO. The latter is referred as the “CODELCO law”, which was implemented in 1958 and suffered several variations along decades. The project presented in June 2012 aimed to derogate the “CODELCO law” completely.