

Candidate Selection and Women in Brazilian Politics.

Braga Maria do Socorro.

Cita:

Braga Maria do Socorro (2010). *Candidate Selection and Women in Brazilian Politics*. V Congreso Latinoamericano de Ciencia Política. Asociación Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política, Buenos Aires.

Dirección estable: <https://www.aacademica.org/000-036/621>

**ALACIP 2010 - V Congreso de la Asociación Latinoamericana de
Ciencia Política**

Partidos y Sistemas de Partidos

Candidate Selection and Women in Brazilian Politics

Maria do Socorro Sousa Braga (UFSCAR)

msbraga@ufscar.br

Abstract: This paper focuses on studying patterns of women's political trajectories in Brazil - a country that underwent a recent transition and that adopts a gender quota policy. The main goal is to assess whether there are clearly distinguishable patterns of constituency support to successful candidacies to the Federal Senate. In order to do that, seven elections will be examined, comprising twenty-six years since the current multiparty system has been in place.

Keywords: political parties, women, federal senate, gender quota policy, political trajectories

28 - 30 de julio de 2010

Buenos Aires, Argentina

Candidate Selection and Women in the Brazilian Politics¹

Maria do Socorro Braga* (UFSCar)

Introduction

The Brazilian party system has been through 14 elections since its reorganization in the beginning of the 80's. Some of the main parties in Brazil went through, still in their origins, a long transition process of the political regime, which has existed for almost 30 years. Although new when compared to their congeners from old democracies, these parties have been making fundamental activities for the functioning of the politic democracy in a social and economical context traditionally based on great inequities of opportunities: 1) organizing the population's political participation via elective process; 2) structuring the competition of the diverse groups for power, being adding interest, recruiting and forming parties' leaders and professional politicians, being distributing diverse types of resources and incentives to their affiliates; and finally, 3) governing the three spheres of power that form the Brazilian federative State, promoting the political negotiation and the construction of the consensus.

Nevertheless, when we investigate under the perspective of gender on its internal structure, as well as their representatives in the Legislative Houses, we verified that there is a great disparity among them. As we are going to see up next, even though the number of elected women has grown through all these years, they continue with a minority participation in the governing bodies, though they are the majority in number within the population and inside the electorate. Several studies have pointed to explanations for this political fact. BOHN's paper (2007), for example, reveals that the reduced presence of women in the Brazilian senate when compared to the American senate, results from a low political professionalization of the candidates. It's still worth noticing that in other studies which analyze several bicameral democratic countries (IPU:1997, 2000; ARAÚJO:2001; DARCY, WELCH & CLARCK:1994), the women have insignificant number of presence, particularly in the senate.

¹ This article is a partial result of the Research Project **Political Parties: Organization, Political Recruiting and Representation**, developed in the Social Sciences Department of the University Federal of Sao Carlos, with financing from FAPESP.

*Professor of Federal University of São Carlos, São Paulo, Brasil.

In face of these diagnostics the present paper has two goals: the first one is to examine the level of involvement of women into Brazilian politics with respect to the disputes for elective positions and which political parties are they representing and getting elected for. The second one is to verify who they are, where are they from and where are going the Brazilian female senators whom although the contextual obstacles has gotten to enter into the federal senate. The hypothesis to be examined is that the affiliated senators to parties of the right got the representation counting on a political and social capital originated from patrimony and personal interrelations inherited by family bonds. Now the senators from the party of the center are close to the pattern identified among women elected by the right parties, meaning that most part of their resources are from patrimony. Then the women elected by parties from the left had their main basis of support and maintenance from social movements and from their own parties, because we assume they followed the right “political career structure”, obtaining at each election a more and more prestigious position until they reached the Senate. Due to these differentiated party interrelations, and the senators linked to left associations, they are more financially and organizationally independent.

To route this analysis the text was structured in the following manner. On the next section the relation among political party, electoral participation and female representation in the Brazilian democracy are going to be discussed. Right after, the section II will exam who are the senators and verify the occurrence or not of different basis patterns of support and sustainability that distinguish parties and well succeeded candidacies for the Federal Senate in Brazil.

I – The relationship between political party, electoral participation and female representation in Brazilian democracy.

What is the involvement of women in the Brazilian politics? For what positions and by which parties are they getting elected for?

To answer these questions, first we have to locate the institutional environment in which the politic-electoral competition in the Brazilian political system occurs. Later we will verify what are the female participation degree and the success for the diverse elective public office that compose the structure of opportunities offered by the institutional system.

The circumstances that, surrounded the reorganization of the recent Brazilian politic system, are already known. Their origins are clearly connected to the end of the authoritarian regime and to the construction process of the Brazilian representative democracy. During this process was defined the political-institutional arrangement due to the Constituent in 1988, maintaining the federative system, the presidential form of govern system and the bicameral of the National Legislative Power. Furthermore, the general lines of the electoral system remained with the providing principle and the open list for the elections of municipal, state and federal, and majority principle for the disputes of the Executive and Senate. It is worth emphasizing that in the Brazilian Senate the alternates are chosen by the chair/seat holder, meaning that they do not pass by the sieve of the electorate. From the point of view of the political citizenship extension, Brazil reached its peak in 1985 with the acquisition of the right to vote by the illiterates, and in 1988 with the lowering of the minimal limit for voting to 16 years of age. The performance of the enlargement of this participation from the electorate started increasing in the 2000 elections, when the electronic urn began being used all over the national territory, making it easy to vote and to count the votes.

It was still in the transition context that the party reorganization law from October 1979 allowed that a new system of political parties emerged. A still restrict multi-partisanship, especially because it placed political dilemma, still happened in plebiscitary terms — in favor and against the then authoritarian regime. This multi-partisanship flourished in 1985 after the promulgation of the Number 25 Constitutional Emend, which favored the process of organization of new parties, what was even more intensified in the constituent period.

It is still worth mentioning two other institutional mechanisms related to the dynamic of the representative process (established in the 1990s) which started to influence the political competition. The first one was the reelection dispositive through which after 1994 all the politicians elected to executive positions started having the right to one more mandate of 4 years. The second one was the homologation of the policy of quotas by gender starting in 1998 establishing that the parties would have to reserve a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 75% of the vacancies in the party's lists for women².

²The policy of Quotas for the women in Brazil was proposed by the then federal deputy Marta Suplicy from the PT in 1995 right after the World Women Conference, in Beijing, China, where its integrants proposed the equality between the sexes in the political power. This law, number 9.100/95,

Three aspects of the political-representative system are relevant to understand how the process of political representation is happening in the Brazilian democracy. The first one is a matter of the *electoral participation*, with its complications for the legitimacy of the electoral process and the functioning of the party system.

In a party democracy the legitimacy of the representatives comes in part from the legitimacy of the mandate received in the urns. According to the electoral system that governs the parliamentary election, is the party or the coalition that detains the mandates and distribute them according to the voting order of individual candidates. Before that for the party to become apt to occupy the seats/chairs in the Congress, it needs to reach an electoral quotient which varies according to the magnitude of each electoral district. On the other side, because voting is mandatory in Brazil, besides the abstentions, the null and white votes are which inform us what part of the electorate is unsatisfied with the performance of the politicians and parties, furthermore with its own democratic regime.

The second aspect refers to the *number of parties* of a party system. This number is important because indicates the degree in which the political power is dispersed or concentrated. The same way, knowing how many relevant parties exist we are alerted for the number of possible political and ideological options/orientations that are interacting in the different environments — electoral and governmental and by then, available to the citizens who aim to dispute elective offices. Besides the strategic actions of the parties leadership in the electoral competition and in the legislative process are related with the format of the party system, which in turn has important influence as much on the candidates recruiting process and political leaders formation as to how the governmental coalitions are formed and act.

The third aspect relates the two prior ones because it deals with the matter of how are or not the Brazilian political parties achieving to represent the female universe in the political arenas. This is a crucial aspect in the Brazilian democracy having in consideration that women constitute a higher number of the population and of the

establishes that at least 20% of the vacancies of each party or coalition should be filled by women candidature. Due to the received criticism in 1997, the 9504 law established the reserve of at least 25% of the vacancies and at most 75% for the women in the party's list. This new parameter began in 1998 with the parties reserving normally 30% of the vacancies.

electorate. Comparing them to men, they are reaching higher degrees of schooling as well as higher cargos of high command in private and state companies.

1.1 – Electoral Participation in Brazil

The *electoral participation* allows us to demonstrate the degree of political inclusion and the credibility of the party system between different groups and proposals. The amount of voters in relation to the electorate is the first measure to identify the part of apt citizens to participate politically and the part that really does it. Table 1 describes the variance of the electorate, the number of voters and the electoral abstinence in Brazil throughout the recent democratic period. In 26 years the electorate has grown up 95,7%.

Table 1 – Electoral Participation* - 1982/2008**

Electorate		Voting		Abstaining	
		Nº	%	Nº	%
1986	68.576.451	65.133.227	95,0	3.443.224	5,0
1989	82.056.226	70.250.194	85,6	11.806.032	14,4
1990	83.820.556	71.940.913	85,8	11.879.643	14,2
1994	94.743.043	77.660.795	82,0	17.082.248	18,0
1996	99.300.826	81.104.893	81,7	18.196.004	18,3
1998	106.053.106	83.280.755	78,5	22.766.744	21,5
2000	108.493.400	92.230.142	85,0	16.262.386	15,0
2002	115.184.176	94.741.120	82,3	20.442.672	17,7
2004	119.818.378	102.815.156	85,8	17.003.222	14,2
2006	125.827.049	104.779.065	83,3	21.047.984	16,7
2008	130.378.807	110.085.172	85,5	18.721.420	14,5
Main		84, 5		15,4	

Source: Nicolau (1998), TSE, 2006

*By lack of enough information the elections from 1982, 1985, 1988 and 1992 were not computed.

**The 1986 and 1990 elections were for the Federal and State Legislative Houses and for the State Executive. The 1989 election was for the Presidency, while those from 1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006 started to involve all the disputes for all the National Executive and State positions. Now the elections of 1996, 2000, 2004 and 2008 were for municipal positions: mayors and councilmen.

The period where the Brazilian electorate grew the most was between 1986 and 1990. The least growth was from 1982 to 1986. The total of voters in regards to the electorate, as well as the abstinence, presented a pattern of variation that clearly demonstrates its relation with political conjuncture from the period under analysis. Two elections were particularly meaningful, which reflected the high percentage values of voters and the low abstinence: 1986 and 1989. The election of 1986, besides choosing the representatives of the Constituent National Congress, occurred under the effects as much from the electoral re-registration as and mainly under the impact of the Cruzado I

Plan. Now the election of 1989 had as a fundamental motivation factor, the direct election for president of the republic after 29 years. It is still necessary to draw attention to the percentage of appearances in the general election in 2006, the highest when compared to the three prior ones (2002 and 1998), despite the situation marked by political crisis and scandals involving parliamentary persons from both Legislative Houses. Another important aspect revealed by table 1 is about the growth in the rate participation from the voters in the last three local elections, that meaning for the municipal level which is a good indicator of the importance and involvement from the voter in the power sphere that is directly bound to its daily routine.

But what is the female share plot from the Brazilian voters? As we can see in table 2, until the elections of 1998 men maintained a slight majority in regards to women. From that year forward women started having the majority in numbers.

Table 2- Distribution of the electorate by Gender				
	Female	%	Male	%
1988	37.158.744	49.01	38.305.256	50.53
1989	40.218.211	49.0	41.518.323	50.59
1990	41.082.440	49.01	42.400.684	50.59
1992	44.390.596	49.2	45.521.160	50.45
1994	46.804.055	49.38	47.681.889	50.31
1996	50.207.052	49.57	50.789.296	50.15
1998	53.033.650	49.98	52.794.597	49.76
2000	55.437.428	50.48	54.152.464	49.31
2002	58.604.571	50.85	56.431.672	48.96
2004	62.148.537	51.23	58.974.994	48.61
2006	64.822.477	51.57	60.690.555	48.29
2008	67.482.079	51.76	62.736.118	48.12

Source: data from the TSE

1.2 – The Brazilian party system: format and ideology

In December 1979, in the process of transition from regime, Law 6767 reformed the Organic Law of Political Parties then currently in the Brazilian context, making it possible to create other parties. We have by then the emerging of a new party system. This system was amplified after the Constitutional Emend of 1985, which established total freedom of party organization, with the creation of the PCs and several other parties. With respect to the initial organizational structure situation the recent party system is characterized according to Braga (2006), by the existence of five parties that beard differentiated profiles, expressing defined political-programmatic positions in

the ideological spectrum, endowed with very unequal political and organizational resources that could be used in the political competition. So, next to effectively structured parties nationwide, which concentrated most of the political frameworks such as the Social Democratic Party (PDS), and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), because those parties kept their organizational structures during the dictatorship, the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Labor Democratic Party (PDT), and the Laborers Party (PT) did not have this territorial organizational base.

In that sense for the PMDB and the PDS the first disputes meant the possibility of competing openly and develop an organizational structure that had already existed; for the PTB and the PDT, with a number of parliamentarians with a higher historical insertion in the national political life of the country, it represented a work of articulation of organizational structures in the state and local level; but for the PT 1982 meant the need to organize a national political party from very precarious bases because the resources from the few parliamentarians that it got to regiment still concentrated itself basically in the state of São Paulo. Beside the fact that the placed political dilemma still was happening in plebiscite terms: to support or not the authoritarian regime in favor of reestablishing the representative democracy made a lot of sectors from the political class identified with the left ideas and the civil society to continue seeing the PMDB as the most capable party to reach/achieve this objective. However, their contradictory/inefficient acting in the conduct of the national economic politic next to the PFL through the re-democratization, promoted substantial changes in the correlation of partisanship forces giving form to the political spectrum and distance between these forces of the system. This matter reflected obviously in the representation of parties in the first elections that inaugurated the recent system of parties.

In tables 3 and 4, can be verified the parliamentary representation of Brazilian parties in the Federal Chamber and in the Senate over the period investigated. For that, the parties were organized among big ones (those with more than 10% of the seats) medium ones (from 4% to 9% of the seats) and small ones (less than 4% of the seats), according to the seats obtained in the 2006 elections. Due to a big number of small parties in each election, they were separated into two groups PPD (small right parties) and PPE (small left parties).

	1982		1986		1990		1994		1998		2002		2006	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
PDS/PP	235	49,1	33	6,8	42	8,3	52	10,1	60	11,7	49	9,6	41	8
PFL			118	24,2	83	16,5	89	17,3	105	20,5	84	16,4	65	12,7
PMDB	200	41,8	260	53,4	108	21,5	107	20,9	83	16,2	74	14,4	89	17,3
PSDB					38	7,6	62	12,1	99	19,3	71	13,8	66	12,9
PT	8	1,7	16	3,3	35	7	49	9,6	58	11,3	91	17,7	83	16,2
PSB			1	0,2	11	2,2	15	2,9	19	3,7	22	4,3	27	5,3
PDT	23	4,8	24	4,9	46	9,1	34	6,6	25	4,9	21	4,1	24	4,7
PTB	13	2,7	17	3,5	38	7,6	31	6	31	6	26	5,1	22	4,3
PL/PR			6	1,2	16	3,2	13	2,5	12	2,3	26	5,1	23	4,5
PCB/PPS			3	0,6	3	0,6	2	0,4	3	0,6	15	2,9	22	4,3
PPE ¹			3	0,6	6	1,2	15	3	10	2	18	3,5	32	6,2
PPD ²			6	1,2	77	15,3	44	8,5	8	1,5	16	3,1	19	3,7
Total	479	100	487	100	503	100	513	100	513	100	513	100	513	100

Source: Own Elaboration from information of the Data Bank of Nicolau, Jairo, Iuperj, 2006.

¹PPE = Political Parties from the Left between 1986-2006 (PCB/PPS, PS, PMN, PV, PSTU, PSOL, PCB E PCO).

²PPD = Political Parties from the Right between 1986-2006 (PDC, PSC, PMB, PH, PMC, PASART, PPB, PTR, PND, PRT, PNR, PCN, PTN, PN, PRN, PDI, PRP, PST, PRS, PSD, PAS, PSL, PD, PLH, PRONA, PT C, PHS, PSDC, PT do B, PAN, PSU, PAP, PEB, PBM, PTRB, PRT B E PGT.

PARTIES	Table 4 – Party Representation in the Senate (1982-2006)													
	1982		1986		1990		1994		1998		2002		2006	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
PDS/PP	15	60	2	4,1	2	6,5	2	3,7	2	7,4			1	3,7
PFL			7	14,3	8	25,8	11	20,4	5	18,5	14	25,9	6	22,2
PMDB	9	36	38	77,6	8	25,8	14	25,9	12	44,4	9	16,7	4	14,8
PSDB					1	3,2	9	16,7	4	14,8	8	14,8	5	18,5
PTB					4	12,9	3	5,6			2	3,7	3	11,1
PT					1	3,2	4	7,4	3	11,1	10	18,5	2	7,4
PDT	1	4	1	2	1	3,2	4	7,4			4	7,4	1	3,7
PPE ¹			1	2	1	2	2	3,7	1	3,7	4	7,4	3	11,1
PPD ²			1	2	5	16,1	3	5,5			3	5,5	2	7,4
TOTAL	25	100	49	100	31	100	54	100	27	100	54	100	27	100

Source: Own Elaboration from information of the Data Bank of Nicolau, Jairo, Iuperj, 2006

¹PPE: PMN, PSB, PPS, PC do B

²PPD: PRN, PST, PP, PMB, PDC, PL, PSD, PRT B

Until 1986, the composition of the political forces in the two Legislative Houses existing in the prior regime were maintained as the main party organizations, even with the division inside the party, which gave support to authoritarian governments: PMDB, PFL and PDS. Among the new parties created in 1980, the PT and the PDT began to achieve a more consistent electoral support. Several small parties with a tiny electoral

expression arose. Anyway in terms of power concentration, it is notorious the supremacy of PMDB in the two Houses, configuring a party system of a predominant party. In the 1990 election the power in the Federal Chamber started being divided among several parties. Two big parties remained maintaining the highest blocs: the PMDB and PFL. The PDS continued practically stable. Now the PT and PDT increased considerably in representation. The PSDB reached a reasonable success on its second dispute. There was also an important increase in the representation of small parties from the right that all together added 15% of the seats of those Houses. In the Senate three parties began controlling the biggest blocs: PMDB, PFL and the PTB.

In the 1994 and 1998 elections we had a Chamber with basically five big party forces: PMDB, PFL, PSDB, PT and PPB/PPR. The medium parties maintained reasonable voting, though the PDT started a tendency for declining. Also, almost half of the number of seats from the PDD went down. Yet those from the PPE began an inverse trajectory, increasing very slowly its parliamentary expression. Now at the Senate the biggest parties are only three: PMDB, PSDB and PFL. Some medium size parties increased their representation for example, the PT and PDT.

In the last two elections 2002 and 2006 for the Chamber, the same five parties remained with the highest support from the electorate. However, there were significant changes between the occupied positions: in 2002 for the first time the PT achieved the highest bloc. The second highest stayed with the PSDB. The third position was obtained by the PFL, with the PMDB very close to the fourth position. The PP, on its way maintained a declining tendency. The same happened to the small parties from the right reaching 3,1% from the total of the seats/chairs. A notable data observed in these two elections concerns on the significant growth of number of electorate that started to vote in one of the PPE, increasing the representation of those parties up to 6% in the 2006 elections. One of the possible explanations for this has to do with the arrival of the PT into the federal government, but because governmental decisions which resulted in internal conflicts and disagreements resulted on the exit of its historical members and the consequently creation of PSOL. Beyond creating one more left party, the turn of PT to the center-left of the political-ideological spectrum, bonding even with parties from the right, left the Brazilian electorate identified with positions from the left and with more freedom to vote in other options from the same political field.

In the Senate the alternation of a political group governing the country, which happened in the 2002 elections, had as a consequence the increase of representation

from the bloc of the PT, which reached the group of the biggest parties formed already by the PMDB, PSDB and PFL. Another group of parties which had a significant increase in this House were those from the PPE, reaching 11 % of the seats.

Summarizing, although the differences about the degree of dispersion of the parliamentary power observed between the two Houses, which happens according to the duvergiana classification (1954), due to two different logics of competition promoted by the majority electoral system (Senate) and the proportional (Chamber), are the same four party's forces that have been keeping themselves as the biggest blocs in the National Congress since 1998: in the center of the ideological political spectrum are PMDB and PSDB, to the right is the PFL/DEM, and to the left is the PT. Around these parties particularly in the Chamber, come the medium ones: more to the center are the PTB and PPS, to the right is the PP and PR, and to the left the PDT, PCdoB and the PSB. And at last there is a myriad of small associations divided between the right and left fields.

1.3 - The representation of women in the Brazilian politics

Given its large structure of elective office positions available for the parties and their affiliated by the Brazilian representative-political system, which ones are that present a higher number of female candidacies? What is the female representation in the parties' blocs? For which parties are they getting elected for? The large and complex structure of political competition in Brazil is a challenge to the survival of the political parties which are necessary each two years³, coordinate specific strategies of political recruiting and the dispute for positions at a municipal, state and national level⁴. It can be thought that at the same time such structure of opportunities presents higher chances to obtain a candidacy, especially for proportional positions. In the case of women, assuming on the basis of specialized literature (Katz and Mair: 1982, Rule and Zimmerman: 1994; Norris: 2003 and Mathand: 2002), that they would have more access inside institutional systems such as the Brazilian one because of the existence of three other factors: multi partisanship, the proportional system of representation for the Legislatives and the high magnitudes from the State districts.

³ The election to a municipal level occurs in different years from the general elections to the state and national spheres. These elections will not be included in the analysis for being in process of systematization.

⁴ About the selection process of candidates in Brazil see BRAGA, 2008a e RODRIGUES, 2002.

According to table 5, it is verified that although the existence of a high disparity of gender in the distribution of the candidacies for any type of position by the parties even after the establishment in 1995 of the quotas policy (which destines 30% of the vacancies to women), the highest number of female candidacies is especially observed for the legislative positions, resulting in a bigger female representation. The relation between the number of female candidacies and the success in obtaining a parliamentary seat in the four examined prior elections, revealed that in average women obtained higher representation inside the Federal Chamber and in the Senate, respectively 10,3% and 10, 1%. Right after, comes the Legislative Assemblies with 9,6% of well-succeeded candidacies.

Table 5 – Percentage of females candidacy for office (1994 to 2006)								
	1994		1998		2002		2006	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
President	0	0	1	8,3	0	0	2	28,6
Federal Deputy	185	6,1	353	10	490	11,5	628	12,7
Senator	17	7,3	23	13,6	40	12,5	32	15,8
State Deputy	571	7,2	1.270	12,6	1.638	14,4	1.602	13,9
Governor	13	9,7	14	9,3	21	10,4	25	12,8
Total of Female candidacies	786	7,0	1.661	12,0	2.189	13,5	2.289	13,6
General Total of candidacies	11.344		13.799		16.165		16.851	

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE.

In regards to the Brazilian women representation in the two federal Legislative Houses the data from table 6 and 7 revealed that although they continue pretty low when compared to the male group, a tendency of continuous growth in the Federal Chamber and the same trend in the Senate it is observed.

Table 6 – Parliamentary and Gender representation in the Federal chamber: 1982-2006

Federal Chamber

	1982		1986		1990		1994		1998		2002		2006	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Female	8	1,6	26	5,4	29	5,6	32	6,2	29	5,7	42	8,1	45	8,8
Male	471	98,3	461	94,6	474	94,4	481	93,8	484	94,3	471	91,9	468	91,2
Total	479	100	487	100	503	100	513	100	513	100	513	100	513	100

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE.

In the Federal Chamber, they have been present since 1982 when 8 women achieved the first seat in the inaugural elections of the new party system. They practically tripled the representation in the 1986 elections and kept reasonably constant between the ones in 1990 and 1998. In 2002 and 2006 however it was observed a higher increase in seats conquered by women in this Legislative House, when they achieved five more times the amount of seats than in 1982.

Table 7 – Parliamentary and Gender representation in the Senate: 1982-2006

Federal Senate														
	1982		1986		1990		1994		1998		2002		2006	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Female	0	0	0	0	1	3,2	3	5,5	2	7,4	8	14,8	4	14,8
Male	25	100	49	100	30	96,8	51	94,5	25	92,6	52	85,2	23	85,2
Total	25	100	49	100	31	100	54	100	27	100	54	100	27	100

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE.

Now in the Senate, women only got representation through the election of 1990. As we are going to see below, in the 1983-1986 legislatures as well as in the 1987-1990 ones, we identified the female presence in the Senate but in those cases they are only a replacement, meaning women substituted the voted titular chairman. The highest female representation was also identified in the elections of 2002 and 2006 when they achieved respectively 15% of the seats.

One of the possible explanations for the increase in the female participation in the period of 2002 to 2006 is the arrival of the Laborers Party (PT) to the Federal government and consequently the alternating of political groups in the control of the main spheres of power. Traditionally according to the international literature the left parties are the ones that have stimulated the insertion of women into the politics when they created incentives aiming to amplify the female participation. That is what the tables 8 and 9 demonstrate when revealed for which parties and ideological blocs the

women were elected for the two Legislative Houses between 1998 and 2006.

Table 8 – Distribution of the female representation in the Female Chamber by party and ideological bloc(1998-2006*)

	1998		2002		2006		Total from the period for party and ideological bloc	
Party from the Left	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
PT	5	17,2	14	33,3	7	15,2	26	22,2
PSB	1	3,4	2	4,8	6	13,0	9	7,7
PC do B	2	6,9	4	9,5	5	10,9	11	9,4
PSOL	0	0	0	0	1	2,2	1	0,9
PDT	1	3,4	1	2,4	1	2,2	3	2,6
Total from the bloc	9	31	21	50	20	43,5	50	42,7
Parties from the Center								
PMDB	8	27,6	4	9,5	9	19,6	21	17,9
PSDB	7	24,1	6	14,3	3	6,5	16	13,7
PPS	0	0	0	0	2	5,1	2	1,7
PTB	0	0	2	4,8	0	0	2	1,7
Total from the bloc	15	51,7	12	28,6	14	30,4	41	35,0
Parties from the Right								
PFL/DEM	5	17,2	6	14,3	5	10,9	16	13,7
PPB/PP	0	0	1	2,4	4	8,7	5	4,3
PL/PR	0	0	0	0	1	2,2	1	0,9
PRONA	0	0	0	0	1	2,2	1	0,9
PSD	0	0	1	2,4	0	0	1	0,9
PST	0	0	1	2,4	0	0	1	0,9
Total from the bloc	5	17,2	9	21,4	11	23,9	25	21,4
General Total for Election	29	100	42	100	46	100	117	

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE.

*There are not systematized information for the election of 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1994.

According to data from tables 8, the PT was the party that has elected most female candidates for the Federal Chamber between 1998 and 2006, reaching 22% of the seats. Comparing the electoral results by vote, it was verified that in the elections of 2002 was that the PT more than doubled its female representation reaching 33% from the total of women elected in that election. On second place comes the PMDB with 18% from the total women elected. Following on the same position are the PSDB and the PFL/DEM, with about 14%. Among the small and medium parties, those from the left were the ones that increased the most their female representation particularly, the PC do B and the PSB.

About the ideological blocs, it was observed that was the bloc from parties of the left that reached also the highest percentage of seats getting almost 43% from the total

of elected women. The bloc of parties from the center presented the second highest number of representatives in the period reaching 35% of the seats. On the other side, the blocs from the right presented the lowest performance achieving 21% of the seats in the analyzed period. Now at the Senate, it is observed in table 8 that in the period of the three elections analyzed the PT was the party that presented the highest number of female representatives. Then the PFL/DEM— the biggest bloc from the right — remained with the second highest female representation. The PSDB elected the third biggest share. The only small party which elected a female senator at the period was the PPS.

In regards to the representation for ideological blocs, the women from the left continued with a higher insertion also in the Senate. Differently from the Chamber, the women members of parties from the right were the ones who achieved the second highest representation in this House. Coming after were the female senators in the center of the ideological political spectrum.

Table 9 – Distribution of the female representation in the Senate for party and ideological bloc (1998-2006*)

	1998		2002		2006		Total in the period for party and ideological bloc	
Party from the Left	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
PT	1	50	5	62,5			6	42,9
PSB								
PC do B								
PSOL								
PDT								
Total from the bloc	1	50	5	62,5			6	42,9
Parties from the Center								
PMDB								
PSDB			1	12,5	1	25,0	2	14,3
PPS			1	12,5			1	7,1
Total from bloc			2	25	1	25	3	21,4
Parties from the Right								
PFL/DEM	1	50	1	12,5	3	75	5	35,7
PPB/PP								
PL/PR								
PTN								

PSL									
PST									
Total from the bloc	1	50	1	12,5	3	75	5	35,7	
General Total	2	100	8	100	4	100	14		

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE.

Finally, it is perceived by the two tables that the biggest parties in the three ideological blocs are those that got to elect more female representatives for the Federal Chamber and especially for the Senate. In this last one, one of the possible explanations for the big parties to control them, are the electoral rules which balise the dispute as well as the low magnitude of the districts (they elect 1/3 in one election and 2/3 in the other). According to TAAGEPERA:1989; SHUGAR & CAREY:1992 e CAREY:1997 countries with a majority electoral system of simple majority and low magnitude tend to concentrate the format of the party system in maximum two relevant parties. In addition, other studies have shown that to obtain the candidacy in the selective process inside the party for competitions with the majority system is much more valued and harder to be obtained, whether being by debutants in politics, or by parties with a weak organization and capillarity in the diverse segments of society.

II – The institutional and social ways and short cuts followed by the female senators: Who they are, where they come from and how they reached the Federal Senate

But who are the women that occupied a seat in the Federal Senate in the period of 1982 to 2006? Where are they from? Which are the paths that they trailed to get to that Legislative House?

To search for answers to these questions, the hypothesis to be tested in this section is that the female senators joined parties from the right, got representation counting on social and politicians capital/money originated from patrimony and personal relations inherited by family bonds. Now the senators for parties of the center are closer to the pattern identified between the women elected by parties of the right, meaning that they arrived to the Senate more by the influence of relatives' politicians and less for any prior political career. The women that got through the parties from the left we suppose that trailed the right "political career structure", obtaining at each election a more and more prestigious position until they arrived at the Senate. For this it would have been fundamental a bigger participation of these women as well in

movements as inside social and corporative institutions.

To examine this hypothesis initially we described the variable to be used, when the party preferences and the ideological blocks from the female senators who participated in that House in the period of 1982 to 2006 are going to be identified. It also will be verified which was the mean of obtaining of mandate by women, since for the Senate there are two possibilities: by popular election and by replacement. Next, we examined the predominant social-economic profile among the women legislators. At last we analyzed if there is any distinction among the paths taken by the women to get to the Senate — when our hypothesis will be tested. For that the associations are going to be verified by the coefficient of contingency and the possible relations between social capital and movements' participation, and ideological blocs will be verified by an indicator created from the involvement or not of the female senators in social and corporative institutions.

2.1 – Party's and ideological preferences from the Brazilian female senators and formal ways of obtaining a legislative position

By which parties are the women obtaining access to the Senate in the analyzed period? And through what formal means? In more than 30 years, since the inaugural elections of the return of multi-partisanship in Brazil in 1982, 31 women have occupied a seat/chair in that Legislative House. According to table 10, a little more than half — 54, 8% — was elected by popular vote, while 42% came to the Senate by a short cut: the replacement⁵.

Table 10 – Distribution of the Female Senators by Party and Ideological Preferences and means of entrance into the Federal Senate

ideological bloc	Party	Women senator	holders	appointed
Left	PDT	3,2	6	0
	PT	29	47	7,1
	PSB	3,2	0	7,1
	Total from the bloc	35,5	52,9	14,3
Center	PTB	3,2	0	7,1
	PMDB	12,9	6	21,4

⁵ According to the Brazilian electoral legislation, the holder of the Senator's position necessarily needs to be elected by the simple majority from her electoral district, in this case the state. But this holder wins with her/his election the prerogative of choosing two replacements, following its own personal criteria. These replacements substitute the holder when by diverse reasons is unable to occupy that position.

	PPS	3,2	6	0
	PSDB	12,9	11,8	14,3
	Total from the bloc	32,3	23,8	42,8
Right	PFL/DEM	16,1	23,5	7,1
	PDS/PPB/PP	16,1	0	35,7
	Total from the bloc	32,3	23,5	42,8
N		31	17	14

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE

About the party's and ideological preference of those senators, it was verified a reasonable fair distribution among the three ideological blocs, though the parties classified as occupants of the left field of the political-ideological spectrum present a slightly higher percentage. In this last bloc the PT is the preferred party of women adding 29% of the senators. In the bloc from the right the DEM and PP are the parties with the highest percentage of senators, adding 16% of the women elected in the period that was analyzed. Now among the parties from the center, the PMDB and the PSDB were the ones that put more women in the Senate reaching 13% from the total.

About the means of obtaining the representation, the senators that were affiliated to the parties from the center and from the right, curiously presented the same and the highest percentage of replacements, which was 43%. On the left bloc the percentage fell down to 14%. This is an important data which runs towards our hypothesis. Even though other evidences are necessary, we already know that almost half of the women from the right and center bloc reached the Senate without facing the urns, meaning that they did it by indication from the seat/chair holder, which is connected to the influence of personal and political relations based on family and patrimony bonds. On the other hand, most of the women affiliated to parties from the left got elected by popular vote, which denotes given the demands of the electoral market, another way to reach the Federal Senate, and therefore another kind of prior political trajectory that guaranteed to them the support of the electorate.

Between the parties of each bloc, in the right the PP was the party that put more female replacements in the Senate reaching almost 36% of the total of replacements. A surprising fact is that the whole bench of this party, at the analyzed period, was formed only by replacements. In the center the PMDB placed the second highest number of women through this short cut that is 21%. Taking into consideration that these are the two oldest parties from the recent multipartisanship system, one of the explanation for this fact might be related to the political capital accumulation, throughout the years, in the hands of determined political groups (or family clans), or even party's leaderships.

We emphasize that in the left, the parties use three times less this expedient. The PT had just one replacement in the whole analyzed period. Now a smaller one, the PSB, had only one female senator over the years through the replacement short cut.

2.2 – Who are the Brazilian female senators: social-economic profile

The examination of the background data from the Brazilian legislators done by Santos (2003), made him affirm that there is a *“filter through which is possible to predict the social-economic characteristics of the Brazilian deputies from 1946 to 1999. Male, age between 40 and 60 years old, with a higher instruction level and an attorney that is the profile of the Brazilian legislator”* (Santos, 2003:122). That is the profile found for federal deputies. Now for the Senate, which one would it be? What about the female senators, the objective of this article? We can affirm that is pretty close to the one found for the federal deputies. That is, the Brazilian Senate is composed mainly by men with a superior schooling and graduation in the areas of law, administration and economy.

Did the female senators have the same profile? It can be verified by reading table 11 that in the period analyzed, women between the ages 46 and 65 prevailed, which indicates that older women are the ones who reach the Senate. This has to do with the characteristics from the restrictive format of the political competition for the Senate.

Table 11 – Distribution of the Senator by age in the period of 1982-2006

Idade_Agregada					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	36 a 45 anos	7	21,2	22,6	22,6
	46 a 55 anos	12	36,4	38,7	61,3
	56 a 65 anos	11	33,3	35,5	96,8
	66 a 75 anos	1	3,0	3,2	100,0
	Total	31	93,9	100,0	
Missing	System	2	6,1		
Total		33	100,0		

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

But are there meaningful age differences among the women of each party by ideological spectrum? Table 12 shows an important difference. The percentages reveal that while the women associated to parties from the left and the center are younger, ages

between 36 and 55 years, those who are from the parties of the right were older, closer to the general profile of the legislators. Another fundamental information is related to the degree of association between these variables, see table 13, evaluated by the contingency coefficient, which goes towards what is expected from our hypothesis but differently from what was supposed, the women associated to the parties of the center and the left are the ones closer to the age of those who reach the Senate, differently from the women from parties of the right.

Table 12 – Percentage distribution of the Senators by age and ideological bloc (%)

		Spectrum Parties			
	years	Center	right	Left	Total
Aggregated age	36 a 45	36,4	20,0	10,0	22,6
	46 a 55	45,5	10,0	60,0	38,7
	56 a 65	18,2	70,0	20,0	35,5
	66 a 75	0,0	0,0	10,0	3,2
Total (N)		11	10	10	31

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

Table 13 - Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	,531 ,059
N of Valid Cases	31	

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

In regards to the instruction level, table 14 shows that the majority of women like the male legislators, have also a higher degree. For Ranney (1965) and Norris (1995), the tendency for the great presence of a legislator with a higher degree might be explained by the demand of the parties' leaderships that prefer more educated citizens because this aspect suggests more ability, capacity and prestige to the political class.

Table 14 – Distribution of the senators by schooling in the period of 1982-2006

		Escolaridade			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Ensino Médio completo	1	3,0	3,2	3,2
	Ensino Superior completo	30	90,9	96,8	100,0
	Total	31	93,9	100,0	
Missing	System	2	6,1		
Total		33	100,0		

Fonte: Dados retirados do Repertório Biográfico do Senado Federal e DHBB-FGV (2001)

Now the degree of association between the schooling degree and ideological bloc described in table 15 is fairly low, it is explained by the fact that most of the women have a higher degree, then there are no differences between the senators by ideological blocs. An intriguing fact is that the only senator with a medium level of instruction is associated to a party from the right, when international studies indicated that this would be more expected if she were from a left party due to its logic of interaction with the organized civil society, which is highlighted for a higher political involvement and participation of its associates in the popular and social movements.

Table 15 – Percentage distribution of the Senators by schooling and ideological bloc (%)

Party spectrum				
	Center	Right	Left	Total
High school	0,0	10,0	0,0	3,2
College	100,0	90,0	100,0	96,8
Count N	11	10	10	31

Table 16 - Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx.	Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	,256	,338
N of Valid Cases	31		

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis

In spite of the similarity of the profile from Brazilian legislators, with regards to the academic training, the examination of the data aggregates from the table 17, allow us to verify a lesser presence of female senators with a degree in the area of law, while being the second highest group of professionals with 15% of the total. In this matter there is a predominance of women with a degree in the area of education, forming 33% of the female senators. It is still interesting to call attention that as already demonstrated by Rodrigues (2002) for the federal deputies, also among the senators the liberal professions have been a highlight. Another interesting data, which is in contrast with the profile of the legislator of the Federal Chamber, is about the minimum presence of handcrafting professionals among women in the Senate.

Table 17 – Distributions of the senators by Professional/Academic Degree in the period of 1982-2006

Profissao		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Advogado(a)	5	15,2	16,1	16,1
	Artista Plástico(a) e Assemelhados	1	3,0	3,2	19,4
	Assistente Social	1	3,0	3,2	22,6
	Bancário(a) e Economiário(a)	1	3,0	3,2	25,8
	Empresário(a)	1	3,0	3,2	29,0
	Enfermeiro(a)	1	3,0	3,2	32,3
	Jornalista e Redator(a)	2	6,1	6,5	38,7
	Médico(a)	2	6,1	6,5	45,2
	Odontólogo(a)	1	3,0	3,2	48,4
	Pedagogo(a)	1	3,0	3,2	51,6
	Psicólogo(a)	1	3,0	3,2	54,8
	Sociólogo(a)	2	6,1	6,5	61,3
	Funcionário(a) Público(a)	1	3,0	3,2	64,5
	Professor(a)/Profissional da Educação	11	33,3	35,5	100,0
	Total	31	93,9	100,0	
Missing	System	2	6,1		
Total		33	100,0		

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

In regards to the distribution of the professions by ideological blocs, it can be seen through table 18, that over the analyzed period the senators from the center bloc followed by those associated to the left parties are the ones that most adopted the liberal professions — 45,% and 36%, respectively. The senators from the bloc from the right constitute only 18% of the liberal professionals. Another interesting data: most of these senators are education graduated professionals. This fact is related with the traditional political engagement of these professional categories in complaining movements. The high contingency coefficient of relation between these two variables reveals that in fact is quite certain the association between a female senator having a profession and being associated to a party, especially from the left or from the center.

Table 18 – Aggregated Profession by Spectrum Parties

Profession	ideological blocs			
	Center	Right	Left	Total

Lawyer	20,0	40,0	40,0	5
Plastic Artist	0,0	100,0	0,0	1
Social Worker	100,0	0,0	0,0	1
Banking	100,0	0,0	0,0	1
Entrepreneur	0,0	100,0	0,0	1
Nurse	100,0	0,0	0,0	1
Journalist and Writer	50,0	50,0	0,0	2
Medical	0,0	50,0	50,0	2
Dentist	0,0	0,0	100,0	1
Pedagogue	0,0	100,0	0,0	1
Psychologist	0,0	0,0	100,0	1
Sociologist	0,0	50,0	50,0	2
Government Official	100,0	0,0	0,0	1
Vocational Education	45,50%	18,20%	36,40%	11
Base (N)	11	10	10	31
	35,50%	32,30%	32,30%	

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

Table19 - Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx.	Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	,648	,661
N of Valid Cases	31		

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

According to Marengo (2000), the explanation to this fact is in the type of relation that the candidate has with the party. Candidates who have their own political capital and do not depend too much from the party's structure tend to be casted by the parties that more distribute selective resources than the collective ones. Thus, left

parties which depend in big part from engagement of their associates, tend to raise funds among the most popular classes where there is a bigger ideological representation and a dependency on the party's resources.

In short, it was found that the social-economic profile of the Brazilian female Senators in the period of 1982 to 2006 was as follows: women with a higher education mostly educators, and in less proportion attorneys in the range of 46 and 65 years old, predominated. About the profile by ideological bloc was verified that the senators associated to parties from the left and the center, were younger, and acted as liberal professionals, with a predominance of teachers and lawyers. Now the senators from right parties are older and presented a lower rate of professional occupation. These findings show that about the sociological profile of the women who reached the Senate, the senators from the center and left are closer, distancing themselves from the identified profile for the senators from the right.

This fact also reveals that even though the way of obtaining the position approaches senators from the right and center, differentiate them from the representatives from the left, as seen above, regarding the social-economic profile, the senators from the center are closer to the ones from the left, distancing themselves from legislators associated to parties from the right. As to the schooling degree, the legislators from that House maintain a higher educational pattern, with the majority of them presenting a higher degree. This pattern has been already identified by other studies about Legislative Assemblies and the Federal Chamber (Santos, 2003; Rodrigues, 2002, and Marengo, 2000).

2.3 – Institutional capital and the Senators' political career

Being identified the first evidences in the sense of demonstration of the hypothesis of diverse paths lived by the women from their respective parties and ideological filiations to reach representation in the Senate, following will be examined the main variables which have been suggested as those with higher explanation power on the differentiated patterns of the political trajectories from the females representatives until they arrived to that Legislative House: more political participation and the occupation of positions inside diverse social and corporative institutions.

To do that, we made an indicator to identify the existence or not, of an institutional capital influencing the senators' political trajectory according to the

ideological profile from their respective political parties. This indicator was created from the aggregation of the experiences that each senator went through when participating in each institution. For each institution where she occupied a position, we established a score and for each one that she didn't pass by, she didn't receive any points. Such institutions include ten different units including labor, feminist, ecologic, students, and religious among others. After tracing the indicator from 0 to 10, the same thing was added into the following categories: from 0 to 3 as low capital, from 4 to 6 as medium capital and from 7 to 10 as high capital.

In general, according to the reading of the data from table 20, the Brazilian female senators are concentrated **in the low institutional capital, i.e., most of them did not pass by several social institutions before reaching the position.**

Table 20 - Institutional Capital			Total
	Observed N	Expected N	Residual
low Capital	28	11	17
Medium capital	4	11	-7
High Capital	1	11	-10
N total	33		

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

However, when we evaluated the institutional capital of the senators by ideological spectrum, we verified, according to table 21, that those representatives from the left concentrated a higher degree of experiences of medium and high capital, while all the ones from the center and great part from the right, accumulated medium capital, i.e. most of the senators had some type of participation inside the social and corporative institutions examined. However the senators from the left concentrated a higher number of these institutions, which may explain at least in part the origin of the obtaining the position by the electorate support when counting on a diversified population segment.

It is important to call attention to the contingency coefficient from table 22 below, which even suggests some relation among the variables, but we didn't obtain enough significance for that.

Table 21 - Institutional Capital by ideological spectrum				
	Medium	High	low	Total

		Capital	Capital	Capital	
Party Spectrum	Left	7 (26,9%)	3 (75%)	1 (100%)	11
	Center	10 (38,4%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	10
	Right	9 (34,6%)	1 (25%)	0 (0%)	10
N Total		26	4	1	31

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

Table 22 - Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	,398 ,213
N of Valid Cases	31	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

One other important information to be emphasized is that there is no relation between belonging to a determined party, whatever party it might be and being elected or not. The Chi –square test, as table 23 shows is low and does not have significance. Which means, we have to accept the null hypothesis that there is no difference between one party and another to be elected or not. In any case we must take into account that this is due to the small difference number among elected and replacements.

Table 23 - Test Statistics		
	spectrum party	way of obtaining
Chi-Square	0,065	0,29
DF	2	1
Asymp. Sig.	0,968	0,59
N=31		

Nevertheless, table 24 shows that having social capital may not mean much for the election, but yes to reach up to the *candidate position*. The data also indicates that the elected and replacement women apparently are not very different in that item. Su seems to reaffirm Norris and Lovenduski (1995) thesis, where the difference is prior to the selection done by the party's leaderships. When she reaches the position of

candidate (especially to the Senate), the level among those who get elected or not is relatively small for this universe. **And once again the contingency test, table 25, which is more elastic than the Chi-square test, did not give a high sig (significance).**

Table 24- Way of obtaining and Institutional Capital

way of obtaining	Aggregated Institutional Capital			
		Medium Capital	High Capital	low Capital
	holders	13	3	1
		76,50%	17,60%	5,90%
	appoint	13	1	0
		92,90%	7,10%	0,00%
N Total		26	4	1
				100,00%

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

Table 25 - Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	,230 ,422
N of Valid Cases	31	

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

To evaluate the structural consistency of the senators' trajectory we verified two other variables: occupation of positions in social institutions and the pursuit of elective positions. As we can observe by reading table 26 some correlations with the contingency coefficient are meaningful. Meaning, that the senators that in fact passed by institutions (religious, students, and labor among others), ended up having a higher institutional capital in their career. That stays evident when we use different criteria: one for participation and another for the occupation of positions in social institutions. And in this last case, we found significant correlation mainly in the religious and students institutions, as can be verified in table 27 to 31.

Table 26 – Participation in social institutions and Accumulation of Institutional Capital

Table 25 - Aggregated Institutional Capital

		Medium Capital	High Capital	low Capital	Total
Social Institution	Didn't occupy	23	1	0	24
		88,50%	25,00%	0,00%	77,40%
	occupied	3	3	1	7
		11,50%	75,00%	100,00%	22,60%
	Count	26	4	1	31
Total		100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

In this case the contingency coefficient according to the table 27 below reaffirms that the passage by a social institution along with the occupation of a position results in the increase of institutional capital.

Table 27 - Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	0,521	0,003
N of Valid Cases	31		

Table 28 - Aggregated Institutional Capital

		Medium Capital	High Capital	low Capital	Total
Religious Institution	Didn't	25	3	0	28
		96,20%	75,00%	0,00%	90,30%
	occupied	1	1	1	3
		3,80%	25,00%	100,00%	9,70%
	Count N	26	4	1	31
Total		100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00 %

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

Table 29 - Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	0,519	0,003

Table 30 - Aggregated Institutional Capital					
students institutions		Medium Capital	High Capital	low Capital	Total
	Didn´t occupy	26	3	0	29
		100,00%	75,00%	0,00%	93,50%
	Occupied	0	1	1	2
		0,00%	25,00%	100,00%	6,50%
	Count N	26	4	1	31
Total		100,00%	100,00%	100,00%	100,00%

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

Table 31 - Symmetric Measures			
		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Contingency Coefficient	0,612	0,000
N of Valid Cases	31		

Finally, table 32 below shows the distribution of the positions by political spectrum accumulated by the senators before arriving to the Senate. Some important information about the senators' political career has to do with the type of positions they had already had. As we can see, the proportional positions are predominant because while the senators have accumulated 42% of the positions for the City Council, 39% passed by the Legislative Assembly and 30% by the Federal Chamber.

Table 32 - Distribution of the positions by political spectrum accumulated by the senators before arriving to the Senate 1982-2006					
		distribution by political spectrum (%)			
		Left	Center	Right	Total
Positions occupied before the Senate	Councilor	28,5	28,5	23,2	42,4
	State Deputy	30,7	53,8	15,5	39,4
	Federal Deputy	44,4	33,3	22,3	30,3

	Mayor	66,6	0,0	44,4	0,6
	Governor	57,2	14,3	28,5	0,12
	Vice-Mayor	57,2	14,3	28,5	0,06
	Vice-governor	66,6	0,0	44,4	0,03
N 33	Total*	351,2	144,2	206,6	

Source: Author's elaboration with data from TSE and Dictionary DHBB-FGV (2001).

*Sum of elective offices held and accumulated, that is repeated for each ideological bloc.

The most significant finding to demonstrate our hypothesis is that the women who come from left parties occupy a much higher number of elective positions, than those from the right and center parties, before being elected to the Senate. This evidence makes us suggest that in fact those senators must have followed the **gradual “structure of political career”, i.e., they were obtaining at each election a more and more prestigious position until they reached the Senate.** About the type of occupied position was observed that the majority of these senators occupied positions in the State or municipal executive, meaning, state vice-governor (67%) or governor (57%) and vice mayor (57%). Among the positions in the Legislative Houses, 44% of them were elected for the Deputies Chamber. Now the female senators of parties from the center went through more proportional positions, being the State deputy the highest achieved, 54%, against 33% for Federal deputy. In the right parties there is a more equilibrated distribution of the female senators for positions occupied before, although there is more tendency for the executive positions on a State and Municipal level, particularly for the vice governments (44%) and mayor's offices (44%). The fact that the representatives from the right and left parties present a pattern of political trajectory with a strong tendency for the executive sphere reveals that the two blocs of party are adopting some similar criteria in the selection of their candidates for the Senate, which might be related as much to the logic of the marked electoral dispute by the majority system, as well by the level of demands that the parties' leaderships are adopting to achieve representation in that House.

III – Final comments: Women participation in the Brazilian Politics and Party organization

In the past 20 years in Brazil, the reconstruction process of the representative

democracy has been characterized by the reorganization of the party system and the increasing ideological centralization of political parties. Moreover, there has been the extension of political rights and citizenship. Although since 1995 Brazil adopts a gender quotas system for building the party list, and despite all the democratic progress achieved in past years, yet the female participation in the political arena is quite modest.

This study confirms that in Brazil there is a low representation of women in the political arena, however, it shows also that the female participation has increased in all governmental levels and overall in the legislative sphere e.g. in the Parliament House and the Legislative Assembly of the 27 Federal States. This finding can be explained by the design of the Brazilian representation model that is quite unique. It combines a proportional electoral system with open party lists and the high magnitude of electoral districts for both types of electoral competition. This model is highly beneficial to enhance women representation particularly because in high proportional magnitude systems each party presents a collective list with their candidate names to each electoral district. Moreover, the final number of seats for each party depends on the number of votes obtained by each candidate. The political parties tend to have an electoral incentive to maximize the collective appeal, including candidates from various social segments.

It is important to highlight that in the studied period, there is a strong relation between the number of women launched as candidate by the political parties and their relative success obtained in the elections. These results indicate that the representation of the women in legislative arena is rather results of different variables than the institutional ones. The electoral success of the female candidates was obtained proportionally to the total number of candidatures launched by the parties and especially in the competition for seats in the Parliament House and surprisingly, also for the chairs in the Senate.

From 1998 to 2006, the results of the elections have shown a greater number of female candidates elected for seats in both legislative chambers, and representing significantly the major Brazilian political parties. The Workers Party (PT), party that represents the current reelected Republic President; it is the party that most elected women representatives to both the Senate and the Parliament. Following PT, the second party with the largest number of elected women as Member of the Parliament is the Brazilian Social- Democratic Party (PSDB), while in the Senate the female representatives were candidates from the Liberal Party/ Democratic Party (PFL / DEM).

Considering the ideological spectrum of the political parties, the left-wing parties are the ones which most elected female candidates for the seats in the Senate and for the chairs in the Parliament House. The moderate parties have the second highest female representation in the Parliament House followed by the right-wing parties. In the Senate, the female representation has an inverse configuration from the Parliament House, meaning that the right wing parties are the second in most electing female candidates. These findings support other studies on standards of eligibility of parties for women, involving several European countries (IPU, 1997). In both Brazilian and European cases, the studies justify that the left-wing parties have elected much more female candidates for the Parliament House rather than center parties and above all the right ones.

Looking at the Senate configuration in Brazil the left wing parties have elected more women candidates however the right wing are the ones which has the second representation of the women in the seats of the House and diverging from the findings in the European countries, which the women representation follow the order of left-wing, center and right wings parties.

Concerning the size of the political party, the second pattern indicated by the study is that the big parties are the ones which elect more women for both legislative houses. This finding is quite coherent to the main Brazilian literature regarding women eligibility (ARAÚJO, 2001, 2005; BOHN, 2008). It is justified first by magnitude of the organizational apparatus of the parties in structuring the electoral competition and second by the public resources. Bigger the party, higher is the control of the process of selecting candidates and accessing the party list. Also, these parties have more access to the incentives given by the central government. According to BRAGA and BOURDOUKAN (2008), two public resources are fundamental to the parties in Brazil: the party funds and the subsidized advertisement space in the national media chains. Both incentives are distributed proportionally and according to importance of the party representation in obtained by Senate. Hence, larger is the party in term of representation in the Senate, greater it is its control of the two types of resources.

The next step of the study was to show who women were elected to become Senator and how they reach the candidature position inside the parties. Looking to the relation of fulfillment of the elective position and the election success, the research has an important finding. It shows that that almost half of women who had a candidature representing the right wing and the center parties; they reached the Senate without

competing for their candidatures. On the contrary, they were indicated by the party chairman and in numbers to fulfill the minimal requirements of the quotas. Such findings indicate the existence of a quite bias system characterized by the strong influence of interpersonal relationships and policies based on family ties and heritage. In contrast, the majority of women affiliated to the left wing parties were elected by the popular vote, demonstrating more experience and political professionalism within their political party and more tied links with the public opinion and the electorates. In general it is possible to say that the left-wing female senators have a higher level of professionalism and political experience in comparison with the right-wing female politicians.

Although was not possible to trace the complete trajectory of each senator, the study also found that the most of the female politicians from the left-wing parties had previously fulfilled more positions in the executive spheres, especially at the Federal State level or in the local level. The women from the center parties have experiment positions in the legislative sphere and in the federal and state levels. The few senators from the right –wing parties who had have previous political experience were occupying executive positions in the local and federal levels, however carrying out functions in secondary role as the “ vices. Once more, this finding leads to the previous conclusion that most female politician elected for Senate has little political experience and mainly occupied political positions based on indication and interpersonal-relations.

Moreover, analyzing the variable of social capital accumulated by the left wing senators, it does not influence elections results; neither for women who had been elected nor for the ones who has been appointed for the positions; nevertheless, this variable influences on the process of reaching a position as a party candidate. In addition, senators who has been linked to social institutions, especially religious and student organization have greater institutional capital in their political career.

In relation to the socioeconomic variables, the findings of this study indicate that the left wing senators and the ones from the center parties are quite young and they work as liberal professionals, especially as teachers and lawyers. In contrast, the senators of the right-wing parties are older and they had lower rate occupation.

Despite the need for in-depth data analysis and an elaborated database to run a robust statistical test regarding the main variable mentioned in this research, the study is quite innovative and reveals evidences to confirm the main hypothesis of this work and to accomplish the goal in this article. Moreover, the study raised important issues for

further works regarding the eligibility of the women in Brazil, the possibilities for the female insertion and empowerment in the political arena. It points also important evidences to evaluate how the Brazilian parties are carrying out the gender issues within the Brazilian representative democracy.

IV - Bibliography

- ARAÚJO, Clara (2005) "Partidos políticos e gênero: mediações nas rotas de ingresso das mulheres na representação política". *Revista de Sociologia Política* no.24.
- _____. (2001) "As Cotas por Sexo para a Competição Legislativa: O Caso Brasileiro em Comparação com Experiências Internacionais". *Dados*, 44 (1).
- BOHN, Simone R. (2007). "Women and candidate quality in the elections for the Senate. Brazil and the United States in comparative perspective". *Brazilian Political Science Review*, v. 1, p. 74-107.
- BRAGA, Maria do Socorro S. (2006) *O Processo Partidário-Eleitoral Brasileiro: Padrões de Competição Política 1982-2002*. São Paulo, Humanistas/Fapesp.
- _____. (2008a) "Organizações Partidárias e Seleção de Candidatos no estado de São Paulo". *Opinião Pública*, vol.14 (02).
- _____. (2008b). "Partidos Políticos Brasileiros: consistência ideológica e social no recrutamento parlamentar". *Estudos Históricos* vol.21 (42).
- CHAPMAN, Jenny. (1993) *Politics, Feminism and Reformation of Gender*. Londres: Routledge.
- CAREY, John M. (1997) "Institutional Design and Party System". In: Diamond, L.; Plattner, Y & Tien, H. (eds.). *Consolidating the third wave democracies*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- DARCY, Robert, WELCH Susan e CLARCK, Janet. (1994) *Women, Elections and Representation*. Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press.
- DUVERGER, Maurice (1954). *Os Partidos Políticos*. Rio de Janeiro. Martins Fontes.
- IPU (2000). "Women in Politics – 1945-2000". *Serie Reports and Documents*, n. 37, Genebra.
- IPU (1997) "Men and Women in Politics: Democracy Still in the Making - A Comparative Study". *Series "Report and Documents"*, n ° 28. Genebra: IPU.
- KATZ, Richard & MAIR, Peter. (1992) *Party Organizations*. Londres: Sage Publications.
- _____. (1995) *How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*. London, Sage Publications.
- FIGUEIREDO, Argelina e LIMONGI, Fernando (1999) *Executivo e Legislativo na Nova Ordem Constitucional*. Rio de Janeiro, Editora Fundação Getúlio Vargas
- KINZO, Maria Dalva (1993). *Radiografia do Quadro Partidário Brasileiro*. SP, Fundação Konrad-Adenauer.
- Lovenduski, Joni e Norris, Pippa (1993) (orgs.), *Women and Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MENEGUELLO, Rachel (1998). *Partidos e Governos no Brasil Contemporâneo (1985-95)*. Rio de Janeiro. Paz e Terra.
- NICOLAU, Jairo M. *Dados Eleitorais do Brasil. (1982-1996)*. Rio de Janeiro. Revan, IUPERJ/UCAM. 1998. Site: WWW.iuperj.br/bancos de Dados eleitorais
- NORRIS, Pippa. (2003) "Electoral Engineering: voting rules and political behavior. Internet, abril. WWW.pippanorris.com
- _____. e NGLEHART, R. (2003) *Gender Equality and Cultural change around the world*. Cambridge University Press.
- _____. e LOVENDUSKI, Joni. (1995) *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. *Women in Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ranney, A. (1965) Pathways to Parliament: Candidate Selection in Britain. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.

RODRIGUES, Leôncio Martins (2002). *Ideologia e Composição Social*. SP, Edusp.

RULE, Wilma. (1994) "Parliament of, by, and for the People: Except for Women?". Em: Wilma Rule e Joseph Zimmerman (orgs.) *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*. Westport, Connecticut e Londres: Greenwood Press.

SANTOS, André Marengo. (1997) "Nas fronteiras do Campo Político: Raposas e Outsiders no Congresso Nacional". Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, n.33, fevereiro.

SANTOS, Fabiano (2003). O Poder Legislativo no Presidencialismo de Coalizão. Belo Horizonte: UFMG/Rio de Janeiro: IUPERJ.

SHUGART, Matthew S. (1985) "The Two effects of District Magnitude: Venezuela as a Crucial Experiment." *European Journal of Political Research* n.13.

____ & CAREY, John. *Presidents and Assemblies*. (1992) Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

____. (1995) "The Electoral Cycle and Institutional Sources of Divided Presidential Government". *American Political Science Review*, n. 89.

TAAGEPERA, R. and SHUGART, Mathew. (1989) *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

ZIMMERMAN, Joseph. (1994) "Equity in Representation for Women and Minorities". Em: Wilma Rule e Joseph Zimmerman (orgs.), *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities*.